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This paper compares and contrasts the policy reform experiences of Poland and Turkey en route to
high income. For both countries, globalization has presented unprecedented opportunities to catch up,
unleased by integration into European and global markets and the establishment of macroeconomic
discipline. These opportunities were reinforced by the creation of economic institutions to strengthen
competition and support private entrepreneurship, catalyzed by the convergence process with the
European Union. Both Poland and Turkey have shown resilience following the 2008 global crisis, but
continued success will require renewed structural reform measures. Dealing with the challenging of
aging while at the same time ﬁnding a way to sustain productivity growth through greater domestic
innovation is shaping Poland’s policy agenda. Turkey's structural and demographic potential as well as
its strategic location between the markets of Europe and Asia offers attractive value proposition to
investors, which could be further enhanced with improvements in business regulations and economic
governance.1. Introduction
The decade before the global economic and ﬁnancial crisis saw
unprecedented convergence in incomes between advanced and
emerging market economies. Based on the adoption of prudent
macroeconomic policies, emerging markets beneﬁted handsomely
from accommodating global liquidity conditions. Thanks to a track
record of economic liberalization and structural reforms many
middle income countries became attractive destinations for foreign
investment and emerged as serious players in the global economy,
accelerating a shift in global economic power that had begun in the
early 1980s.
This short paper compares the experience of two such emerging
markets: Poland and Turkey. The main argument of the paper is
that seen against the broader backdrop of globalization and
convergence, the stories of Poland and Turkey are surprisingly
similar. In Section 1 we argue that the process of economic tran-
sition in Poland can be seen as a process of economic liberalizationors and do not in any way
r).
nk of the Republic of Turkey.
B.V. on behalf of Central Bank of Tand integration typical of emerging markets, only of broader scope
and condensed in time. Turkey started the process of opening up its
economy a decade earlier, but Poland achieved the faster conver-
gence thanks to the scope and depth of its reform efforts launched
after 1989. As Section 1.2 elaborates, a key driver of the pace of
change in Poland was EUmembership, achieved in 2004, just a year
before Turkey formally began accession negotiations with the Eu-
ropean Union. European integration was critical to Turkey's reform
process and resulting economic ascent, too, but the impact was less
pervasive and Turkey's convergence was slower than Poland's.
Overall, the message from our analysis is that globalization
presents unprecedented opportunities for emerging markets to
catch-up, if they open their economies, keep macroeconomic
discipline, and reform their economic institutions to strengthen
competition and support private entrepreneurship. And these
opportunities are compounded for countries on the periphery of
the European Union that are offered the prospect of accession,
because European institutions function like a “tractor beam” for
institutional reform in accession countries allowing conﬁdence to
build long before the process of institutional reform has been
completed.
The paper closes by casting a look ahead. Both Poland and
Turkey have shown resilience during the post-crisis period, but are
facing more moderate growth prospects in a less forgiving global
environment. Which country has better prospects to converge tohe Republic of Turkey. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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“middle income trap” literature, the paper comes out with a
balanced assessment. Poland's strengths lie in its higher degree of
openness, its stronger economic and political institutions, lower
degree of inequality and somewhat stronger capacity for innova-
tion. Poland also beneﬁts from less macroeconomic vulnerability,
thanks in part to decisive anti-inﬂation policies around a decade
ago. Poland's challenge is to safeguard these achievements and to
deal with aging and reform social security arrangements accord-
ingly. Turkey's strengths lie in favorable demographics and the
greater remaining potential for gains from the reallocation of labor
from agriculture to industry and services. Turkey's challenge is to
attract investment and create enough productive jobs to beneﬁt
from the demographic dividend. Both countries are likely to see
growth above EU averages over the coming decade. Which country
will converge faster depends on which country moves more deci-
sively to address its most pressing structural challenges.
The year 2014 is a historic and symbolic year to be writing about
Poland's and Turkey's transition experiences. The two countries this
year celebrate 600 years of diplomatic relations. Poland also cele-
brates 25 years of transition from Communism, and 10 years of
membership in the European Union. Turkey can look back to over 30
years of experience with economic liberalization, with current ac-
count convertibility achieved in 1984. 2015 marked the 20th anni-
versary of the Customs Union agreement with the European Union
and 10 years from the formal start of accession negotiations.
This paper is in no way an attempt to do justice to these very
important milestones and achievements. Rather we draw on the
large literature summarizing the lessons of the transition experi-
ences in Poland and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe
(see for instance World Bank, 1996; Blanchard, 1997; Roland, 2014;
EBRD, 1999, 2010; World Bank, 2009; IMF, 2014; Lipton, 2014), and
a recent World Bank study on Turkey's own transition from a state
controlled to a market based economy (Raiser and Wes, 2014; see
also €Onis¸ andWebb,1992; Canevi, 2014).1 The purpose of this paper
is not to evaluate Poland's and Turkey's experiences in their own
right, but rather to explore their commonalities. In this vein, the
paper also draws on the study of European convergence present in
Gill and Raiser (2012).2. Unleashing the private sector: economic liberalization and
the roots of convergence in Poland and Turkey
Poland's economic transformation from a centrally planned to a
market based economy has been among the most successful of all
former communist countries. Poland's GDP in Euro terms rose
sixfold since 1990, its GDP per capita in constant prices more than
doubled over the same period as economic growth averaged
slightly more than 4 percent. Some would say not since the days of
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, when Poland and Turkey
ﬁrst established diplomatic relations, has Poland felt so conﬁdent,
have its national aspirations been backed by a clear rise in eco-
nomic prowess. Turkey is among the more successful emerging
market economies that began opening up to the world economy in
the early 1980s (China did so in 1978, India in 1991, Latin America
also largely abandoned import substitution strategies and multiple
exchange rate practices during the 1980s and 1990s). Its GDP has
also grown at around 4 percent since the 1980s (and around 3
percent per capita), with acceleration in the ﬁrst decade of the1 Martin Raiser and Marina Wes both worked at the EBRD in the mid-1990s and
were involved in several of the EBRD's Transition Reports, which since 1994 have
provided an annual update of reform progress in the region, including Turkey since
2011, when the country became an EBRD country of operations.2000s, when GDP in Euro terms tripled. Both Poland and Turkey
have thus converged to European Union income levels, standing in
2013 at 68 and 55 percent respectively of the EU average in pur-
chasing power parity terms (Fig. 1). In this section, we trace the
roots of convergence back to a common set of basic economic re-
forms: price, trade and foreign exchange liberalization, sound
macroeconomic policies, and a gradual retreat of the state from
direct involvement in production.
2.1. A dynamic private sector
The motor of economic convergence in both Poland and Turkey
was the same: a dynamic private sector, with a particularly
important role played by domestic SMEs. Gomulka (2014) points to
the strength of Poland's domestic private sector as a key factor
behind the country's shallower transition recession. The rise of a
new generation of Turkish entrepreneurs in the growing inland
cities of Anatolia has been associated with Turkey's recent eco-
nomic success and socio-economic transformation (Atiyas and
Bakıs¸, 2013). As a result, Polish and Turkish enterprises delivered
among the highest productivity and export growth rates among a
group of emerging market peers (Fig. 2).
2.2. Structural change drives productivity growth
Private entrepreneurship was also the driver behind dramatic
structural changes in Poland's and Turkey's economies. However,
the nature of structural change was quite different in the two cases.
In Poland's case, workers moved from unproductive state-owned
enterprises in the industrial sector to service sector jobs (and
some manufacturing jobs created by new private enterprises). The
reallocation of workers from unproductive to productive enter-
prises is shown by EBRD (2013) to have been a major driver of the
high rate of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth in Poland and
other transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. By
contrast, TFP in Turkey e whilst also rapid e was driven mainly by
the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry and services.
In other words, while within sector labor reallocations were at the
core of productivity gains in the transition from communism, in
Turkey the transition was from an agrarian to an urban economic
structure. Indeed, among a group of peers, Turkey is the only
country that saw an increase in employment in industry since 1990
(Fig. 3). As of 2014, Poland and Turkey had a similar share of
employment in manufacturing (around 20 percent), but Poland had
a larger services sector, and Turkey still had around 30 percent of
employment in agriculture.
2.3. A rapid opening of the economy raised new challenges for
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial sector management
The catalyst of all this dynamic, private sector driven structural
change was the move to an open foreign trade regime and the
abolition of domestic price controls, ensuring that market signals
were allowed to work effectively. The story for Poland is well
known e as of January 1990 the vast majority of prices were
liberalized, as was foreign trade and a ﬂoating exchange rate was
introduced (see Gomulka, 2014). What is perhaps less well known
today is the extent to which Turkey's economy in the 1970s was
hampered by price controls, closed to foreign competition, and
riddled with state intervention. In 1980, Turkey's total exports were
a mere US$ 3 billion, multiple exchange practices abounded, and
the government controlled the prices of a substantial number of
consumer goods (particularly agricultural products, fuel and im-
ported manufactures). With Turgut €Ozal's economic reform pack-
age introduced in January 1980, Turkey embarked on a more
Fig. 2. Polish and Turkish ﬁrms deliver.
Source: Penn World Tables; World Development Indicators
Fig. 3. Different patterns of structural change in Poland and Turkey.
Source: World Development Indicators
Fig. 1. GDP per capita, PPP, current international $.
Source: World Development Indicators
M. Raiser et al. / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 7e17 9
Fig. 4. Economic transition as a special case of globalization.
Source: Fraser Institute
M. Raiser et al. / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 7e1710gradual but nonetheless comprehensive process of economic
liberalization. Comparative time-series data on price and trade
liberalization is difﬁcult to come by. Fig. 4 from the Fraser Institute's
indices of Economic Freedom show the time proﬁle of foreign trade
liberalization in Poland and Turkey. The curves are remarkably
close to one another.
One key challenge faced by economic liberalizers in Poland and
Turkey was the question how to deal with the ﬁscal and social
consequences of rapid liberalization. This was compounded in both
cases by a history of macroeconomic instability, provoked by un-
sustainable domestic ﬁscal and incomes policies. Hence macro-
economic stabilization had to be achieved at the same time as the
economy was opened. Both Poland and Turkey owe their success in
recent decades to their ability to combine sound macro and
ﬁnancial policies with market based structural reforms. Yet, they
learned the relevant policy lessons differently (see Fig. 5 for a
summary of basic macroeconomic developments).
Poland spent much of the 1980s in economic crisis. By 1989,
GDPwas lower than a decade earlier, the economywas ﬂirting with
hyperinﬂation and Poland had stopped servicing its international
obligations to western creditors. The economic package introduced
in January 1990 thus combined signiﬁcant ﬁscal adjustment (pri-
marily through incomes policies leading to a sharp decline in real
wages), with a large upfront exchange rate devaluation and a
monetary program anchored around targets for the growth in do-
mestic credit, before moving to a ﬂoating exchange rate regime by
the end of 1991. Poland's progress with macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion was gradual: inﬂation did not fall below 10 percent for around
a decade, ﬁscal deﬁcits were above 3 percent of GDP in most years,
and public debt has increased by around 20 ppts since the late
1990s to just under 60 percent of GDP today. However, after the
deep crisis of the late 1980s, Poland never again lost control over
macroeconomic policies. In the face of persistent inﬂation and
rising external deﬁcits in the late 1990s, the National Bank of
Poland tightened monetary policy sharply in 2000, bringing inﬂa-
tion down to 5.5 percent the following year, a rate which it has
never since exceeded.
Turkey took two decades to digest the need for consistent
macroeconomic policies to support the economic liberalization
effort. The initial €Ozal package of 1980, as in Poland a decade later,
was combined with upfront exchange rate adjustment, tight in-
comes and ﬁscal policies and moderate credit expansion. But to-
wards the end of the 1980s, quasi-ﬁscal activities proliferated,reminiscent of Janos Kornai's famous “soft budget constraints”
which accounted for the many failed gradual liberalization at-
tempts in Eastern Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. The result
was repeated macroeconomic instability, culminating in the crisis
of 2001with high rates of inﬂation, a run on the banking sector, and
a sharp depreciation of the Turkish Lira. Only with the ensuing
macroeconomic and structural reform program of 2001e2002 was
ﬁscal policy brought under control and Turkey now counts among
themost successful case studies of rapid ﬁscal consolidation among
emerging markets (see Gill and Raiser, 2012; Raiser andWes, 2014).
However, Turkey's inﬂation rate remains in the upper single digits
and external imbalances have caused bouts of macroeconomic
volatility in recent years. Turkey's Central Bank may wish to study
the NBP's success in anchoring inﬂationary expectations in the face
of signiﬁcant political resistance around a decade ago and the
resulting improvement in Poland's external balances, in contrast to
developments in Turkey over the same period.
In one additional respect Turkey and Poland share an interesting
commonality: both countries have sound banking sectors that went
through the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008e2009 unscathed. As
Europe is discovering again today, well capitalized and prudently
managed banks are a key pillar of successful private sector led
growth. Poland and Turkey are among those countries in Europe
which have learned to harness the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration
and managed the associated risks in a disciplined way.
2.4. A cautious approach to privatization
The third pillar of economic reform programs in both transition
and emerging market economies during the 1980s and 1990s was
privatization. This is also perhaps the most controversial of all re-
form policies. Poland's route to privatization was unusual among
former Communist countries, as the country largely shunned mass
privatization schemes, and instead opted for policies to nurture the
growth of new SMEs and to impose hard budget constraints on
SOEs to force them to adjust to the market (and limit any ﬁscal li-
abilities). Only after several years of transition did Poland privatize
some of its ﬂagship SOEs, generally through trade sales to foreign
investors. Privatization revenues peaked in 2000 at around US$ 6
billion (Fig. 6). In this, Poland's route to privatization was similar to
Turkey's which undertook an ambitious privatization program
particularly after 2001, but has maintained signiﬁcant state pres-
ence throughout the economy. Indeed, according to the OECD,
Fig. 5. Sound macro policies were critical to success.
Source: World Development Indicators, IMF World Economic Outlook
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share of public ownership and state control. While both countries
have avoided the political and economic pitfalls of mass privati-
zation, some legacies of a previous period of state led economic
development remain.
3. European integration: a convergence catalyst
Like many other countries in the world, both Poland and Turkey
have become substantially integrated with the European and global
economies during the ﬁnal decade of the twentieth and the ﬁrst
decade of the 21st century. Turkey's economy has opened up
signiﬁcantly since the 1980s when exports amounted to only 5
percent of GDP against 23 percent today. In the last two decades, the
pace of opening up was far more dramatic in Poland, however,
where the share of trade in GDP more than doubled to over 90
percent, against just under 60 percent inTurkey (Fig. 7). Poland's andeastern Europe's export performance more generally set the region
apart as one of the most rapidly globalizing parts of the world,
rivalling the East Asian tigers (Gill and Raiser, 2012). Turkey's per-
formance is signiﬁcantly better than that of many countries in Latin
America, but lags somewhat behind the pace in Asia and Eastern
Europe. In this section, we argue that for both Poland and Turkey,
European integration lay at the heart of growing global competi-
tiveness and hence was the motor behind economic convergence.
3.1. EU integration as the motor of globalization and technological
upgrading
The key driver of Poland and Turkey's rising global presence has
been closer economic integration with the European Union. For
Poland, evidently, the key policy anchor in this regard was EU
accession itself, achieved in 2004. However, as early as 1991, the
Europe Agreement (EA) was signed between Poland and the EU,
Fig. 6. Privatization followed only after market order was well established.
Source: World Bank Privatization Database
Fig. 7. Poland and Turkey open up to international trade in recent decades.
Source: World Development Indicators
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economic relationships. Its trade liberalizing measures were to
create, over a ten-year time span, a free trade agreement in in-
dustry. The Europe Agreement also covered various other areas
including trade in select agricultural goods and services, movement
of factors, progressive liberalization of cross-border services, and
lifting of foreign investment restrictions. The EA thus provided
guidance and discipline to Poland's economic transformation well
ahead of EU accession.
For Turkey, the Customs Union with the EU, established on
January 1, 1996, has been the major instrument of integration into
European and global markets. The Customs Union covers trade in
industrial goods (including the industrial components of processed
agricultural products) and excludes primary agriculture and ser-
vices. Although Turkish exports of many industrial goods to the EU
had been mostly duty free since the 1970s, in Turkey, the Customs
Union drove a considerable reduction in tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers and locked in Turkey's liberal regime for manufacturing trade.
Between 1996 and 2011, Turkey's exports to the EU increased
almost fourfold while Turkey's imports from the EU increased
nearly threefold. Bilateral trade between the EU and Turkeyreached US$148 billion in 2012 making Turkey the EU's sixth
largest trading partner and the EU Turkey's biggest (World Bank,
2014).
Export sophistication in both countries has increased signiﬁ-
cantly since 2000, as the integration with European markets took
hold. Although the gap between two countries has somewhat
narrowed, Poland's export sophistication level remains consider-
ably higher (Fig. 8, panel 1).
Against the background of increased export sophistication
overall, the patterns of technological upgrading have diverged in
Poland and Turkey. Turkey has managed to expand its medium tech
exports, but failed to increase high tech exports, while Poland
successfully increased high tech exports and kept the share of
medium tech exports constant. As shown in panel 2 of Fig. 8, Turkey
caught up with Poland in the share of medium tech exports to total
exports with both standing around 35 percent by 2010. In the area
of high technology, there is a clear divergence in performance be-
tween Turkey and Poland: while the share of high tech exports in
total exports has declined from 8 percent to 4 percent in Turkey
since 2000, in Poland it has increased from 8 percent in 2000 to 14
percent in 2010, before slightly declining to 12 percent.
Fig. 8. Export sophistication increased thanks to integration with European production networks.
Source: Raiser and Wes (2014).
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a key conduit for the transfer of technologies. Intra-industry
trade is a measure of the extent to which domestic producers
are integrated into production networks with trading partners.
Fig. 9 shows that the share of intra-industry trade in total trade
during the period 1997e2008 was higher in Poland than in
Turkey. At the same time, in recent years, between 2001 and
2008, Turkey has seen the second largest increase in intra-
industry trade among OECD countries. A big part of this in-
crease is due to Turkey's integration into European production
networks for automobiles for instance, which went hand in hand
with a dramatic expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
into the sector. Almost three quarters of all FDI into Turkey
comes from EU member countries, with retail, banking, andenergy key sectors in addition to the automobile sector. A similar
link between FDI and integration into European and global value
chains can be observed in Poland, with automobiles, chemicals,
light industry and metallurgy important leading sectors. We
come back to the importance of capital ﬂows as a catalyst for
economic integration below.
3.2. Improved connectivity has reduced barriers to trade
One advantage that both Poland and Turkey have as a source
country for production facilities is good connectivity, particularly
with European markets. One empirical measures of the impor-
tance of connectivity for trade is the Logistics Performance Index
(LPI). It is based on the assessment of logistics professionals
Fig. 9. Growing intra-industry trade reﬂects integration into production networks.
Source: OECD
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average of six components that are critical for logistics
performance:
 Efﬁciency of the customs clearance process.
 Quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure.
 Ease of arranging competitively priced shipments.
 Competence and quality of logistics services.
 Ability to track and trace consignments.
 Frequency with which shipments reach the consignee within
the scheduled or expected time.
Turkey compares well with its neighbors and current competi-
tors in logistics performance (Fig. 10). It is 30th in global rankings,
just below China and above Poland, which occupy the 28th and 31st
position respectively.3.3. Capital ﬂows have been managed prudently by and large, more
so in Poland than in Turkey
As mentioned earlier, capital inﬂows, and in particular FDI in-
ﬂows, were a catalyst of economic integration and technology
transfer in both Poland and Turkey. In this regard, Europe inter-
nationally is an exception. It had been assumed based on evidence
across emerging markets that there was limited scope for countries
to rely on foreign savings to increase investment and accelerate
convergence. Europe's ConvergenceMachine (Gill and Raiser, 2012)
has belied the skeptics. In Europe, higher capital inﬂows have been
associated with higher growth rates and faster convergence.
However, this overall positive assessment is tempered by the clear
evidence of excesses in parts of the European periphery and the
costs of European commercial bank deleveraging on the economies
of Eastern Europe. Clearly, even in Europe, the beneﬁts of capital
Fig. 10. The logistics performance index.
Source: World Bank Logistics Performance Index
Fig. 11. The composition of capital inﬂows into Poland and Turkey differed, but not much.
Source: IMF Balance of Payment Statistics
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frameworks and macroeconomic discipline. By and large, both
Poland and Turkey have been among the beneﬁciaries.
While both Poland and Turkey have recorded large capital in-
ﬂows, the composition of the capital ﬂows between the two
countries has been different (Fig. 11). Whereas Poland has relied
more heavily on Foreign Direct Investment and structural funds
from the EU, the ﬁnancing of Turkey's capital inﬂows has been
generally of a shorter term nature. This in turn leaves Turkey more
vulnerable to shifts in global investor sentiment and a result has
made Turkey's growth more volatile.
One way to assess the nature of capital ﬂows and associated
risks is to look at changes in the net debt and net equity position of
countries. In the Southern European periphery, for instance, the net
equity position declined between 2002 and 2007, whereas the net
debt position dramatically increased. In other words, investors
were leaving, while capital inﬂows ﬁnanced public and privateconsumption. As shown in Fig. 12, Poland and Turkey both expe-
rienced a signiﬁcant widening of the net equity position between
2002 and 2013 and in Poland's case, also a substantial increase in
the net debt position. This attests to a prudent ﬁnancing strategy by
and large, although clearly the composition of ﬁnancing particu-
larly since 2009 has worsened considerably in Turkey. Poland's
much larger net equity position reﬂects the deeper integration of
the country into European production networks and the stronger
inﬂows of FDI over the 2002e2013 period.
4. Escaping from middle income: risks and opportunities
After growing in excess of 4 percent annually for the past two
decades, both Poland and Turkey have been confronted with
signiﬁcantly lower growth rates since the global economic and
ﬁnancial crisis. To a signiﬁcant extent this is related to the slowpace
of recovery in the European Union, both countries' largest trading
Fig. 12. A balanced approach to foreign investment in both Poland and Turkey.
Source: IMF Balance of Payment Statistics
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tential growth have been adjusted downwards to maybe 3.5
percent in both countries.
At the heart of this adjustment is the fact that the gains from
productive labor reallocations e whether due to the end of central
planning or to the process of industrialization and urbanization e
are coming to an end. Future growth will rely far more on pro-
ductivity improvements within ﬁrms, driven by higher rates of
investment, innovation and technology adoption. Since this is
difﬁcult, it is common for growth in middle income countries to
slow down, sometimes to the point that convergence with income
levels in the advanced countries stops altogether, and these coun-
tries remain “trapped” in middle income (Gill and Kharas, 2007).
A vast literature has sprung up to investigate the existence and
determinants of the “middle income trap” (for instance:Fig. 13. A middle income trap risk polygon for Turkey, Poland and peers.
Notes: Macro Risks ¼ CPI inﬂation, Net International Investment Position (%GDP), General G
GDP), Logistics Performance Index, Demographic Potential ¼ Median Age, Labor Force
Inclusion ¼ Gini coefﬁcient on household expenditures, Business regulation ¼ Distance to Fr
Property Rights, WGI Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Tra
potential ¼ Share of Employment in Agriculture.
Source: Authors calculations based on data from IMF, World Bank, Fraser, Transparency IntEichengreen et al., 2012, 2013; Bulman et al., 2012; Aiyar et al.,
2013, building on earlier work on the duration of growth spells
and the causes of growth collapses reviewed in Aiyar et al.). It turns
out that a whole range of factors contribute to sustain or hinder
growth in upper middle income countries. Aiyar et al. group these
factors into four categories: (i) the quality of economic institutions,
(ii) the quality of macro policies as reﬂected in existing imbalances
and ﬁnancial and ﬁscal buffers, (iii) the extent to which a growing
labor force still provides impulses for growth, (iv) the extent to
which potential further gains from structural change exist. The
resulting “middle income trap risk map” shows a greater risk of a
growth slowdown in Poland than in Turkey on account mainly of
demographic and structural factors, while Poland outperforms
Turkey on the quality of economic institutions. In the area of macro
policy, Poland has weaker buffers but Turkey has larger imbalances.overnment Debt (%GDP), Openness ¼ Exports þ Imports (%GDP), Gross FDI inﬂows (%
Participation Rate, Innovation ¼ Mean Years of Schooling, R&D spending (%GDP),
ontier (Doing Business), Fraser Index of Light Regulation, Governance ¼ Fraser Index of
nsparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Open Budget Index, Structural
ernational, and the World Governance Indicators.
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et al. (2013) and map out strengths and weaknesses across a total
of 20 indicators, grouped into eight dimensions. Instead of creating
aggregate indices of vulnerability using coefﬁcients from regression
analysis as weights as in Aiyar et al., we identify the best per-
forming country in each category and then use unweighted aver-
ages of the percentage difference to the top performer to come up
with a risk rating in each of the eight categories. The results of this
“best in class” approach are shown in Fig. 13. The larger the surface
covered by the resulting risk polygon, the smaller the risk of a
growth slowdown.
Poland's main strengths lie in Governance, Business Regulation
and to some extent in having a more open economy. Turkey's
strengths are related to a young population and growing labor force
for the next 15 years at least, and to a still sizeable agricultural
sector offering opportunities for productive labor reallocations. By
contrast demographics and economic structure are Poland's main
weakness, whereas the lack of openness, relatively weak gover-
nance and poor innovation potential represent obstacles to the
realization of Turkey's growth aspirations. We don't know how
these strengths and weaknesses add up, but they indicate a rather
different set of policy challenges for Poland and Turkey as the two
countries embark on the next stages of their economic transition.
For Poland, the coming decades will be marked as in the rest of
Europe by the challenge of adapting the economy, social security
systems and public services to an aging population. As the World
Bank argues in a forthcoming report, this presents at least as many
opportunities as it presents risks. But dealing with the challenges of
aging while at the same time ﬁnding a way to sustain productivity
growth through greater domestic innovation shapes Poland's policy
agenda.
For Turkey, the immediate challenge is to mobilize the required
domestic and foreign savings to invest in private sector job crea-
tion so that the gains from Turkey's demographic dividend are not
wasted. To meet this challenge, Turkey would do well to emulate
Poland's degree of openness and match the quality of its economic
institutions. While Turkey lacks the advantage of EU membership
as an anchor for the required institutional reform and as a magnet
for greater Foreign Direct Investment, given the country's struc-
tural and demographic potential as well as strategic location be-
tween the markets of Europe and Asia, it still offers an attractive
value proposition to investors, which would be further enhanced
with improvements to economic governance and business
regulations.If Poland and Turkey address the challenges outlined above,
there is every reason to believe growth could continue at a rate of 4
percent or higher in the coming decades. That would bring Poland
close to and Turkey within 25 percent of average EU incomes.
Poland and Turkey are two success cases in economic reform and
the resulting transition towards market-based, open economies.
Their success has coincided with a period of unprecedented
convergence in Europe and in the world economy. With appro-
priate reforms, this story could well continue for some time, for the
beneﬁt of Poles, Turks and their European neighbors and friends.References
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